and maintenance.[1] His sole claim is that this statute violates the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it discriminates in favor of riparian owners with a frontage of more than 500 yards; and also because it does not apply uniformly to all the waters of the State. The hearing was on bill and answer. The trial court dismissed the bill on the merits. Its decree was affirmed by the highest court of the State. 150 Atl. 455.

No fact is shown on which to base the contention that the State's power of classification has been exercised unreasonably. The purpose of the legislation is, as the court found, "the conservation of water fowl and the protection and safety of those engaged in shooting them. The necessity for such regulation is apparent, for if blinds could be erected in broad waters at any distance from the shore, without regard to the distance separating them, it would not only be conducive to the destruction and annihilation of ducks and other water fowl, but extremely dangerous to those shooting them." 150 Atl. 457. The provision which prohibits placing a blind within 250 yards of the land of an adjoining owner without securing his consent, is a necessary incident of the preferential right conferred upon riparian owners. See *Sheehy* v. *Thomas*, 155 Md. 688. There was obviously no intention to discriminate in favor of persons having a large water frontage; for the consent provision enables owners of small frontages to join in erecting blinds spaced the requisite distance apart.

Nor is the equality clause violated by the special provisions that in certain inland waters blinds need not be placed farther apart than 250 yards. The state court, relying upon *Lindsley* v. *Natural Carbonic Gas Co.*, 220 U. S. 61, 78, said: "Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume, until the contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto, existed, which warranted the legislature in so legislating." 150 Atl. 458. This long-settled rule disposes also of the alleged discrimination created by the special exemptions applicable to certain other waters of the State.[2]

Affirmed.

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[1]Compare Smith *v.* Howard, 18 How. 71; McCready *v.* Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Manchester *v.* Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Lawton *v.* Steele, 152 U. S. 133.

[2]See Close *v.* Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 475; Powell *v.* Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685; Chicago Dock Co. *v.* Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 686; Rast *v.* Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357.